Workshop on Signaling in Markets, Auctions and Games:
a Multidisciplinary Approach

22-23 May 2019


Download Program (pdf)

Wednesday, May 22nd

9h15 Welcome and Coffee

9h30-11h30 Session 1, Classical Game Theory (Chair: Olivier Bos)
Péter Vida (Universty of Cergy-Pontoise, with Alessandro Ispano): Optimal Interrogations
Francesc Dilme (University of Bonn): Skewed Information Transmission

11h30-12h00 Coffee Break

12h00-13h00 Session 2 (Chair: Gorkem Celik)
Joel Sobel (University of California San Diego): Functional Language in Games

13h00-14h00 Lunch

14h00-16h00 Session 3, Language (Chair: Brian Buccola)
Robert van Rooij (University of Amsterdam): Signaling Games and the Semantics & Pragmatics of Natural Language
Heather Brunett (Paris Diderot University): Signaling Games, Sociolinguistic Variation and the Construction of Style

16:00-16:30 Coffee Break

16h30-18h30 Session 4, Signaling and Evolution (Chair: Sylvain Sorin)
Josef Hofbauer (University of Vienna, with Christina Pawlowitsch): Evolutionary Dynamics of Costly Signaling Games
Minus van Baalen (Ecole Normale Supérieure): On the Ecological and Evolutionary Feedbacks that Affect the Cost and Value of Information: the Evolution of Signals, Information Exchange, and Memes

19h30 Social Dinner

Thursday, May 23rd

9h30-11h30 Session 5, Mechanism Design (Chair: Helmuts Azacis)
Martin Pollrich (University of Bonn, with Olivier Bos, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Tom Truyts): Mechanism Design with Signaling Agents
Nora Szech (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, with Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer and Jonas von Wangenheim): Information Nudges and Self-Control

11h30-12h00 Coffee Break

12h00-13h00 Session 6 (Chair: Rida Laraki)
Françoise Forges (Paris Dauphine University, with Jérôme Renault): Strategic Information Transmission with Sender's Approval

13h00-14h00 Lunch

14h00-16h00 Session 7, Experimental Economics (Chair: David Ettinger)
Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam, with Olivier Bos, Francisco Gomez-Martinez and Tom Truyts): Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence
Francesco Giovannoni (University of Bristol, with Miguel Fonseca and Miltiadis Makris): Auctions with External Incentives: Experimental Evidence

16:00-16:30 Coffee Break

16h30-18h00 Session 8, Miscellaneous (Chair: Yannick Viossat)
Christina Pawlowitsch (Panthéon-Assas University): The Logic of Empty Forms
Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics): Coordination with Noisy Signals

19h00 Wine Tasting