

Workshop on Signaling in Markets, Auctions and Games: a Multidisciplinary Approach

22-23 May, 2019

Wednesday, May 22

9h15 Welcome and Coffee

9h30 – 11h30 Session 1, Classical Game Theory (Chair: Olivier Bos)

Péter Vida (University of Cergy-Pontoise, with Alessandro Ispano): Optimal Interrogations
Francesc Dilme (University of Bonn): Skewed Information Transmission

11h30 – 12h00 Coffee Break

12h00 – 13h00 Session 2 (Chair: Gorkem Celik)

Joel Sobel (University of California San Diego): Functional Language in Games

13h00 – 14h00 Lunch

14h00 – 16h00 Session 3, Language (Chair: Brian Buccola)

Heather Brunett (Paris Diderot University): Signaling Games, Sociolinguistic Variation and the Construction of Style

Robert van Rooij (University of Amsterdam): Signaling Games and the Semantics & Pragmatics of Natural Language

16h00 – 16h30 Coffee Break

16h30 – 18h30 Session 4, Signaling and Evolution (Chair: Sylvain Sorin)

Josef Hofbauer (University of Vienna, with Christina Pawlowitsch): Evolutionary Dynamics of Costly Signaling Games

Minus van Baalen (Ecole Normale Supérieure): On the Ecological and Evolutionary Feedbacks that Affect the Cost and Value of Information: the Evolution of Signals, Information Exchange, and Memes

19h30 Social Dinner

Thursday, May 23

9h30 – 11h30 Session 5, Mechanism Design (Chair: Helmut Azacis)

Martin Pollrich (University of Bonn, with Olivier Bos, Nicolas Fugger, Vitali Gretschko and Tom Truys): Mechanism Design with Signaling Agents

Nora Szech (Karlsruhe Institute of Technology, with Thomas Mariotti, Nikolaus Schweizer and Jonas von Wangenheim): Information Nudges and Self-Control

11h30 – 12h00 Coffee Break

12h00 – 13h00 Session 6 (Chair: Rida Laraki)

Françoise Forges (Paris Dauphine University, with Jérôme Renault): Strategic Information Transmission with Sender's Approval

13h00 – 14h00 Lunch

14h00 – 16h00 Session 7, Experimental Economics (Chair: David Ettinger)

Sander Onderstal (University of Amsterdam, with Olivier Bos, Francisco Gomez-Martinez and Tom Truys): Signalling in Auctions: Experimental Evidence

Francesco Giovannoni (University of Bristol, with Miguel Fonseca and Miltiadis Makris): Auctions with External Incentives: Experimental Evidence

16:00 – 16:30 Coffee Break

16h30 – 18h00 Session 8, Miscellaneous (Chair: Yannick Viossat)

Christina Pawlowitsch (Panthéon-Assas University): The Logic of Empty Forms

Bernhard von Stengel (London School of Economics): Coordination with Noisy Signals

19h00 Wine Tasting

Organizers

Olivier Bos, Panthéon-Assas University

Christina Pawlowitsch, Panthéon-Assas University

Registration and Contact

If you would like to attend, please register on the website: <https://signaling.u-paris2.fr>. If you experience any difficulties, please contact Olivier Bos (olivier.bos@u-paris2.fr) or Christina Pawlowitsch (christina.pawlowitsch@u-paris2.fr)