# Your paper

## **Research question**

Present your own signaling game in the style of the discrete model with two states of the world, two signals and two possible reactions to signals that we have seen in class: find all Nash equilibria and discuss possible applications of the model.

## Your audience

A reader who has some basic knowledge in game theory but does not necessarily know signaling games should be able to follow your argument.

## **Deadline**

Your paper is due April 21, 2023.

Please send it to my address at Paris 2: <a href="mailto:christina.pawlowitsch@u-paris2.fr">christina.pawlowitsch@u-paris2.fr</a>

## Language

Your paper has to be written in English.

#### **Format**

It should be in pdf format, 8-12 pages, 12pt, single-spaced. No table of contents; no new page at the beginning of a new chapter of section; no logos or other ornaments.

The title page should indicate:

- The title of your paper
- Your name
- The course
- The date

Example: Titel page

A review and critical evaluation of Spence's model of costly signaling

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Term paper
Applied Game Theory
Instructor: Christina Pawlowitsch

Master 1 ISF Université Panthéon-Assas, Paris II

March 10, 2020

Your paper should have:

- an abstract and
- a reference list.

Pages should be numbered.

## Standards of academic writing

Your paper should respect the standards of academic writing.

#### Useful resources:

Turabian, Kate L. *A Manual for Writers of Research Papers, Theses, and Dissertations*, 8th ed. Revised by Wayne C. Booth, Gregory G. Colomb, Joseph M. Williams, and the University of Chicago Press Editorial Staff, Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2013.

University of Chicago Press. *The Chicago Manual of Style*, 17th ed. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 2017. Online: <a href="https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html">https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/home.html</a>

#### **Abstract**

The abstract of your paper should not have more than 200 words.

Here is some advice—by two editors—about writing an effective abstract: <a href="https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2017/02/23/importance-writing-effective-abstract-when-you-submit-journal-article-essay">https://www.insidehighered.com/advice/2017/02/23/importance-writing-effective-abstract-when-you-submit-journal-article-essay</a>

## References

References are to be given in the author-date style as recommended by *The Chicago Manual of Style*: <a href="https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools">https://www.chicagomanualofstyle.org/tools</a> citationguide/citation-guide-2.html

This is a quite minimalist style: In the text, the reference is indicated simply by the name of the author or authors with the year of publication in parenthesis.

#### Example

Even if a "fully revealing" equilibrium exists, it is possible that a game has also equilibria in which none of the first player's types ever uses the costly signal (Spence 1973).

If the phrase in the text mentions already the author's name, it is sufficient to indicate the year of publication in parenthesis.

## Example

As already demonstrated by Spence (1973), it is possible that there are equilibria in which none of the first player's types uses the costly signal.

However, for each reference, there has to be an entry in the list of references at the end of the document, specifying the full name of the authors, the title of the work and the publisher.

#### Example

Spence, Michael. 1973. "Job market signaling." *The Quarterly Journal of Economics* 87 (3): 355–374.